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I. UNED STATES CoNTIGuous FISHERY ZoNE
A. Basis for Establishwnent
An unpublicized American offensive in a "wet war" at sea is now
gathering momentum as Coast Guard cutters and aircraft patrol the
North Pacific in search of foreign fishing vessels operating in vio-
lation of treaty or federal statute. The offensive was triggered in
April 1966 when a foreign fishing fleet of over 500 Russian and Jap-
anese vessels systemically swept the waters of the Gulf of Alaska
and the Pacific Coast.1 Often. in sight of the Oregon and Washing-
ton coasts, the threat to depletion of salmon, hake, and other fish
stocks was apparent.2
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1. San Pedro, Calif., News Pilot, Apr. 11, 1966 at 1; Astoria, Oregon,
Daily Astorian, Apr. 11, 1966 at 1; PAcIIc FIsHEmRmAN, May, 1966 at 7.
2. The Soviets stated that they intended to net 220 million pounds of
hake by the end of 1966. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries estimated
that the area could surrender only 200 million pounds per year. PAcmc
FMsmmTAN, Sept., 1966 at 19.
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The fears of the Northwest fishing interests were supported by
a finding that an estimated 81 percent of the total United States
fishery catch is taken within 12 miles of the shores of the United
States.3 From 1959 to 1963, the average fishery catch in the
United States was four and one-half billion pounds. 68 percent of
the total was taken within 3 miles of our shores. 13 percent was
taken within 9 miles contiguous to that 3 miles, and the remaining
19 percent was taken beyond 12 miles from United States shores.4
The comparative development of the Russian and American Pa-
cific Ocean perch and hake catches is dramatic: In 1965 the Ameri-
can catch of perch was 25 million pounds, nearly 10 times that of
the Russians; one year later the Russian catch had doubled that of
the U.S. In 1965 the American catch of hake was three million
pounds and the Russians had not entered the field; one year later
the Russian catch was 20 times higher than the American catch, al-
though the Amerian catch had quadrupled. 5
In October 1966 Congress responded to the aroused Northwest
fishing industry by enacting Public Law 89-658 which declared a 9-
mile fishery zone contiguous to the territorial sea and stretching
uniformly along the United States coastline.8 In customary in-
ternational law "contiguous zone" refers to a belt of sea of a certain
limited breadth located beyond the territorial sea and adjacent to
its outer boundary. Within this zone the coastal state may exer-
cise limited jurisdiction for special purposes.7
Prior to proclaiming the 9-mile contiguous Zone Congress had at-
tempted to protect United States fishing interests in 1964 by enact-
ing Public Law 88-308.8 The 1964 Act made it unlawful for any
foreign vessel to engage in fishing within United States territorial
waters. A maximum fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both, was provided for persons violating provisions
of the Act. Also, it authorized the seizure and forfeiture of any ves-
sel and its catch found in violation.
Until 1964 federal law did not expressly prohibit foreign vessels
from fishing within United State territorial waters.9 There was no
3. H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
4. Id. at 4.
5. Johnson, Foreign Fishing Activities in the North Pacific Coast and
Bering Sea, 11, table 3. Paper presented before the Pacific Marine Fisheries
Commission, Seattle, Wash., Nov. 17, 1966.
6. 80 Stat. 908, 16 U.S.C. § 1091 (Supp. V, 1966).
7. M. McDOUGAL & W. BuRK4 THm PuBLic ORDER OF THE OCEANS 575
(1962).
8. 78 Stat. 194, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-85 (1964).
9. Act of Sept. 2, 1950, ch. 842, 64 Stat. 577.
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provision for seizure or forfeiture of vessel and cargo, nor any pen-
alty against the master. Whenever a foreign vessel did not have a
valid reason for being in United States territorial waters, the only
recourse was for the Coast Guard to order the vessel to leave and
escort her to the high seas. Obviously, the limited scope of the law
failed to serve as a deterrent and enabled foreign vessels to fill
their vessels with United States fishery resources. 10
B. Evolution of Regime of Contiguous Fishery Zones
The enactment of the 1966 Bill firmly established a regime of
contiguous fishery zones in international law of the sea which had
been slowly developing. The evolution was dramatically aided by
the Presidential Proclamation in 1945,11 known as the "Fisheries
Proclamation," in which President Truman asserted the right of the
United States "to establish conservation zones in those areas of the
high seas contiguous to the cQasts of the U. S. wherein fishing ac-
tivities have been or in the future may be developed and main-
tained on a substantial scale."
The United States also had given great impetus to the concept
that exclusive or superior claims to the fish resources in coastal wa-
ters could be validly made in areas beyond the territorial sea plus a
6-mile fishing zone at the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea. This proposal failed acceptance, however, in 1958 and again
at the 1960 Geneva Conference.
12
Historically, one of the principles of law of the sea is that all na-
tions have an equal right to fish on the high seas and superior rights
in the resources are obtainable only on the basis of capture. The
1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the High Seas spe-
cifically enumerated freedom of fishing as one of the freedoms of the
high seas. At the same time the international community gave
recognition to a high seas zones contiguous to the territorial sea,
in which the coastal state was granted special authority for specific
10. H.R. REP. No. 91-1430, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) (Report on "A Bill
to Strengthen the Penalties for Illegal Fishing in the Territorial Waters and
the Contiguous Zone of the United States . . ").
11. Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, "Policy of the United States with
Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas," 10 Fed.
Reg. 12304, 3 C.F.R. 1943-1948 comp. at 68 (1945).
12. M. McDoUGAL & W. Busxm, supra note 7, at 547.
purposes which, however, did not include the exploitation or con-
servation of fishery resources.13
Perhaps the most significant turning point in customary inter-
national law occurred in 1964 when Great Britain passed legisla-
tion to create a fishing zone extending 9 miles beyond her territorial
waters. This was followed in March 1964 by the European Fishing
Conference in which 16 European nations participated and where a
12-mile exclusive fishing zone was recognized.
14
There was also ample precedent in United States history for the
unilateral establishment of a contiguous zone for a special purpose.
In the infancy of the United States, for example, statutes were en-
acted giving the United States the competence to exercise customs
control within four sea leagues (12 marine miles) from the shore.15
Federal court decisions through the years have upheld the right
of the Government to regulate the use of contiguous zones in the
enforcement of the National Prohibition Act'8 and the Anti-Smug-
gling Act.' 7 When the United States Coast Guard seized the Brit-
ish vessel GRACE & RUBY for carrying contraband in violation of
the National Prohibition Act, the vessel was more than 3 miles but
less than 12-miles from shore. The court held that the seizure was
lawful and ordered the vessel forfeited.'8
When the Coast Guard seized the MAZEL TOV, also a British rum
runner, the United States Supreme Court held that the United
States had the power to make the seizure, but by treaty the United
States had imposed upon itself a 12-mile limitation within which
United States authority could be imposed. Therefore, since the
seizure was made outside of the 12-mile limit, a libel for the for-
feiture of the ship should have been dismissed. 19
As a result of the MAZEL TOV decision, the United States broad-
ened its jurisdiction by enacting the Anti-Smuggling Act which per-
mits the President to set special customs-enforcement zones "in
proximity to such vessel or vessels that such unlawful introduction
13. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958 [1962] art. 2, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958 [1964] art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
14. Fisheries Convention Final Draft, Reprinted 58 Am. J. INw'L L. 1068
(1964).
15. An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties on Imports and Ton-
nage, ch. 22 § 25, 1 Stat. 627 (1799). See W.E. MAsTERsoN, JURsDicTioN n
MARGiNAL SEAs 181-92 (1929), for a summary of this early legislation.
16. ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq (1964).
18. 285 F. 475 (D. Mass. 1922).
19. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
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or removal of merchandise or persons may be carried on by or to or
from such vessel or vessels." This special zone is not permanent,
as is the case with the 12-mile customs zone which is permanently in
effect along the entire United States coast, and "shall not include
any waters more than fifty nautical miles outwards from the outer
limit of customs waters.
' 20
II. NORTH PAcIFIc FISHERIES TREATIES
The law of the sea has shown that the regulations of fishery zones
by the coastal state, either unilaterally or by treaty, is a part of na-
tonal development. The 1966 proclamation of a contiguous zone to
conserve fishery resources in United States coastal water had
been preceded by three decades of international negotiation to con-
serve traditional United States fishery catches, that is, salmon, hali-
but, perch, and hake in North Pacific high seas areas.
Numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements have been en-
tered into by the four major fishing nations bordering the North
Pacific. The major international conservation effort with respect to
salmon was signed by the United States and Canada in 1930.21
Other conventions include the Pacific Halibut Conventions of 1930
and 1953 between the United States and Canada,22 and the North
Pacific Fisheries Convention of 195223 signed by the United States
and Japan.
These three conventions provide for the policing and enforcement
of the Treaty provisions on each nation's vessels by the other signa-
tory nation. In the case of violation of the North Pacific Fisheries
and Halibut Conventions any signatory nation may seize the other's
vessels for violation but the vessel must then be turned over to an
official of the flag nation for prosecution. In the case of the Sock-
eye Salmon Convention 24 violators can be seized and prosecuted
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1964).
21. Convention for Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sock-
eye Salmon Fisheries of the Fraser River System, signed 1930, effective
1937, 184 L.N.T.S. 306 (1938).
22. Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the North-
ern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, 121 L.N.T.S. 46 (1931-32), replaced, 222
U.N.T.S. 78 (1955).
23. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean, 205 U.N.T.S. 80 (1955).
24. Sockeye Salmon Convention, supra note 21.
by the nation making the arrest.
The Coast Guard as part of its regular law enforcement mission,
primarily the Alaska Patrol, enforces these conservation conven-
tions and makes seizures when violators are detected.
In order to encourage international cooperation and compliance
with treaty areas and exclusive fishing rights in contiguous areas,
provisions have been included in some instances to provide for
seizure and/or fines. The dramatic expansion of foreign fishing
fleets operating close to United States shores has resulted in fishing
interests through their Congressional representatives to demand
strict enforcement of statutes and treaties. The United States Coast
Guard, the major seagoing law enforcement agency, has been
charged with the duty. Limited funds, however, has restricted the
degree of surveillance. Four cutters and a similar number of air-
craft are now operating out of Alaskan ports engaged in the North
Pacific patrol. It is expected that an increase in congressional ap-
propriations will soon allow for an expansion of the patrol.
III. RECORD OF VESSELS SEIzED AND DISPOSITION
A. Violation of Contiguous Fishery Zone
The first seizure in the United States offensive against foreign
fishing in United States waters was on September 16, 1966, when
the Canadian trawler MISTY MOON was seized within the 3-mile
territorial sea off Chuguinadak Islands in the Aleutians. The mas-
ter was fined $5,000 and the catch was forfeited under the provi-
sions of 46 U.S.C. 1082. On March 2, 1967 the 178-foot Russian traw-
ler SRTM-8413 was seized within territorial waters off the Aleu-
tians. The master was detained, but the vessel was not forfeited.
Two weeks later the Russian Embassy paid a fine of $5,000 for the
master.
The first application of the 1966 Act which established the 9-mile
contiguous zone was on March 22, 1967, when the Russian trawler
SRTM-8457 was seized 5.5 miles off the Aleutians. The vessel ig-
nored the command to stop, hauled in its gear and headed for the
open sea, but the vessel was overtaken by a Coast Guard cutter and
seized. The master was fined $10,000. On July 16, 1967, the Japa-
nese TENYO MARU was seized in territorial waters off the Aleu-
tians. The master was fined $5,000. On August 3, 1967 the Russian
trawler SRTM-8457 was again seized for violation of the U. S. con-
tiguous fishing zone. This time the master pleaded nolo contendere
and was fined $20,000. On June 7, 1968 the Korean trawler SAMSU
was seized within the contiguous zone off Akutan in the Aleutians.
The master was fined $10,000.
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On June 7, 1969 the cutter STORIS seized two Japanese gill
net fishing vessels, KOAI MARU and ZENPO MARU, in Norton
Sound within the contiguous zone. A Fish and Wildlife Service
aircraft had a fleet of Japanese vessels consisting of two mother
ships and 31 gill netters under covert surveillance for three days.
The STORIS was diverted to Norton Sound to apprehend the
violators and found the two vessels 6 miles inside the 12-mile
zone. It was necessary for the cutter to fire shots across the bows
of the two vessels before they would heave to. Boarding parties
were put aboard the vessels and they were escorted to Nome. The
masters pleaded nolo contendere and were fined $3,500 and $5,000
respectively.
A few days later the STORIS received a message from the BAN-
SHU MARU which still has the Coast Guard wondering about the
Oriental mind: "Dear Sir Captain. Thanks for your kindness. We
left Norton Sound for Japan this afternoon. We hope generous dis-
posal for our two boats."
On June 7, 1970 the Japanese AKEBONO MARU was seized 9.3
miles off Yakobi Island, near Chichagof Island. The master was
fined $10,000 plus settlement for $20,000 in lieu of civil suit against
vessel, total $30,000.
One of the largest vessels seized was later released without fine
when it was discovered the vessel's charts were in error. On July
16, 1970 the Coast Guard cutter COMANCHE sighted the Soviet
factory stern trawler KATANGLI fishing off the Klamath River
off the coast of Northern California within the 12-mile contiguous
zone. A Coast Guard officer boarded the vessel and informed the
master that he was violating a United States fishing zone. Through
an interpreteer the two men discussed the vessel's position. From
land the KATANGLI was actually outside the 12-mile limit.
United States territory, however includes small islands or rocks and
the 12-mile limit is measured from the outermost land to the west.
The Soviet charts showed that Redding Rock, from which the 12-
mile zone is measured, was marked on the chart as a wreck. After
marking the Soviet navigation charts to show the correct limits of
the United States fishery zone, the Coast Guard officer departed the
vessel and it was allowed to depart the area.
The Coast Guard cutter STORIS while on fisheries patrol in the
Gulf of Alaska on August 18, 1970 observed and identified the Jap-
anese longline fishing vessel KAKI MARU within the United States
contiguous zone off Middleton Island. The vessel was at position
59-18.5N, 146-05W. This position was obtained by the operations
officer on the STORIS with the aid of the LORAN and radar. With
the use of international signal flags, the Japanese longliner was told
the vessel would be boarded.
Upon boarding the Coast Guard officer requested that the ship's
papers and logs be turned over to him. The boarding officer then
photographed the incriminating entries in the ship's log and re-
turned them to the Captain. The master told the boarding officer
that he thought he was fishing outside the contiguous zone but that
his LORAN and radar were both inoperative. The boarding offi-
cer checked the electronic sets aboard the Japanese vessel and
found them both in excellent operating condition.
The KAKI MARU was escorted into Seward where gear, cargo,
and vessel were appraised for forfeiture value. Upon arrival
inspection of the ship's log showed that it had been altered after the
initial boarding. When shown the photographs of the log depicting
the entries at the time of boarding and asked to explain the discrep-
ancy, the master declined an explanation. He indicated that he was
willing to accept the position obtained by the Coast Guard as the
position where the vessel was fishing. A fine totaling $35,000 was
subsequently imposed for the violation.
On August 21, 1970, a foreign fishing vessel subsequently identi-
fied as the Japanese KIYO MARU was observed by Coast Guard air-
craft in the United States contiguous zone off Alaska. The vessel
ignored a message block that was dropped by the aircraft in a low
pass and headed for the high seas. The aircraft maintained hot pur-
suit throughout the night and notified Coast Guard cutters on patrol
of the attempt to escape. During the night the cutter CLOVER
made positive radar contact and overhauled the vessel at daylight.
Because of the Japanese master's attempt to escape seizure, the cut-
ter's commanding officer was instructed to arrest and remove him
from his vessel if he remained uncooperative. 25 The Japanese vessel
25. See Radio Message from District Commander, 17th Coast Guard Dis-
trict, Juneau, Alaska, to Commandant, Coast Guard:
21163Z AUG 70 x HOT PURSUIT MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT
NIGHT BY COGARD ACFT FROM ANNETTE AND KODIAK.
X 210955Z CLOVER RELIEVED HOT PURSUIT WITH POSITIVE
RADAR CONTACT POSIT 56-28N 138-48W X 211145Z SUBJ VES-
SEL HOVE TO, CLOVER ASTERN VESSEL 1200 YDS AWAITING
DAYLIGHT X ATTEMPTS TO SIGNAL WITH LT, VOICE, AND
FLAGS TO PROCEED SIKTA NEG RESULTS. X CLOVER DI-
RECTED TO BOARD WHEN POSSIBLE SEIZE VESSEL AND
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was eventually taken into Sitka where a fine of $45,000 was levied
against the vessel and master. In addition, the master was given a
one-year suspended sentence.
On August 22, 1969, the Japanese MATSUI MARU was seized 9.6
miles off Herbert Graves Island. The master was fined $10,000.
On September 7, 1970, the Canadian trawler CLIPPER II was
seized 1.3 miles off Cape Muson by the cutter CONFIDENCE. The
captain pleaded guilty to four criminal counts in the state court and
was fined $3,000.00. A federal settlement of $2,000.00 was made out
of court.
On September 27, 1970, the Japanese KYOYO MARU was seized
by the Coast Guard cutter BALSAM while fising 10.5 miles off Atka
Island in the Aleutians. A total fine of $50,000 was levied against
the vessel and master. The master was also given a one-year sus-
pended sentence. During the pursuit it was thought that gunfire
across the bow would be necessary, but the vessel finally hove to.
26
B. VioZations of High Seas Treaty Areas
Seizures of Japanese or Canadian vessels fishing in treaty areas is
provided by the North Pacific Fisheries treaty.2 7 Vessels seized
must be turned over to an official of the flag government for prose-
cution. The Japanese salmon fleet consists of approximately 380
vessels and four patrol vessels. The treaty provides that the vessels
will not fish East of 175 West longitude. This line was drawn as a
conservation measure to reduce the taking of Bristol Bay red or
sockeye salmon which spawn in Alaskan waters.
PROCEED IN COMPANY TO SITKA X IF MASTER UNCOOP-
ERATIVE CLOVER DIRECTED TO ARREST MASTER AND
REMOVE FROM VSL.
26. See Radio Message from District Commander, 17th Coast Guard
District, Juneau, Alaska to USCG Cutter BALSAM:
280445Z SEPT 1970 X SHOULD SUBJ VSL FAIL TO HEED
YOUR SIGNAL TO STOP, ATTEMPT TO TAKE STATION ON
VSL BOW. USE VERY SIGNALS ACROSS BOW OR CLEARLY
VISIBLE TO SUBJ. SHOULD VERY SIGNAL FAIL, WITH DUE
REGARD SAFETY YOUR VESSEL AND SAFE TARGET ANGLE
YOU ARE AUTH TO EMPLOY MACHINE GUN FIRE WELL
FORWARD OF SUBJ BOW WITH FALL OF SHOT CLEARLY
VISIBLE TO SUBJ VSL X IF ALL ABOVE FAIL, ADVISE AND
MAINTAIN PURSUIT X.
27. Art. X of the Convention Authorizes seizure of violators and delivery
to authorized officials of his own nation for appropriate action.
The first seizure was made in 1965. On June, 19 vessels were ob-
served by aerial surveillance in violation. On June 5, the cutter
WAUCHUSETT boarded the WAKASHIO MARU and commenced
towing it to Adak These two vessels were later joined by the Jap-
anese patrol vessel TOKO MARU. In Adak the hold was sealed
and the vessel turned over to the Japanese patrol vessel.
A seizure of a Japanese vessel, DAIEI MARU, while alongside a
dock in Juneau was made on February 4, 1969. The vessel had put
into port for provisions and fuel. When searched by Customs Offi-
cers, she was found to have a catch of illegal halibut aboard taken in
violation of the High Seas Fisheries Convention. The holds of the
vessel were sealed. When the DAIEI MARU sailed, she carried a
complete set of documents to be delivered to the Japanese Fishery
Agency in Toyko for use in prosecution. Another set containing the
physical evidence was sent through diplomatic channels to the Jap-
anese Government.
The Japanese FUKUYOSHI MARU was seized alongside the dock
in Kodiak on February 10, 1969. The vessel had two tons of halibut
in her hold caught in violation of the High Seas Fisheries Conven-
tion. The vessel was released to a Japanese official after her holds
were sealed and copies made of the ship's log for use as evidence in
Japan. On May 27, 1970 the Japanese KOFUKU MARU was ob-
served fishing 78 miles inside the treaty area and was seized. The
vessel was subsequently turned over to a Japanese patrol on the
high seas. On June 2, 1970, the Japanese DAI-ICHI MARU was
seized 4.5 miles east of 175 degrees west longitude and turned over
to a Japanese patrol vessel on the high seas.
IV. LEGAL ASPECTS INVOLVED WIm SEIZURE OF FOREIGN VESSELS
In complying with the Congressional mandate to prevent foreign
vessels from fishing in United States territorial waters, the United
States contiguous fishery zone, and high seas treaty areas, the Coast
Guard has found its actions delimited by ancient law of the sea doc-
trines.
A. Innocent Passage
The primary doctrine to be observed is that of "innocent passage,"
the right of a foreign vessel to traverse the territorial sea between
points on the high seas, enroute from the high seas to internal wa-
ters in accordance with the laws and customs of the littoral state,
or from internal waters following lawful clearance to the high seas.
It may include stopping or anchoring when this is incident to nor-
mal navigation (as when awaiting a favorable tide to traverse a
Wet War-North Pacific
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
particular narrows) or when force majeure or distress is encount-
ered. It does not include hovering, stopping, or anchoring for other
reasons, and it does not include fishing. A foreign fishing vessel in
innocent passage through the United States territorial seas must
comply with all applicable United States laws and regulations.28
Inasmuch as the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Teritorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone contains a comprehensive codification of
the concept of "innocent passage" and expressly sets forth the con-
duct of fishing vessels, Coast Guard enforcement officers have no
difficulty in applying this doctrine.
The question of "innocent passage" does not arise in connection
with navigation of vessels in the contiguous zone. This zone is
part of the high seas and the United States has made no claim that
would be contrary to the customary international law. Following
the 1945 Presidential Proclamation concerning the continental shelf
and contiguous waters, the State Department explained to Congress
that the proclamation did not extend United States sovereignty or
affect the nature of the high seas above the shelf and that it con-
firmed to all nations the right to free and unimpeded navigation.
29
B. Hot Pursuit
The interesting doctrine of "hot pursuit" which gained the Coast
Guard both publicity and notoriety during the rumrunning days is
particularly applicable in present day enforcement of laws and
treaties pertaining to fishing. This doctrine establishes a right un-
der international law for a coastal state to pursue and arrest a for-
eign vessel on the high seas when there is reason to believe that the
vessel has violated laws of the coastal state while in the territorial
waters or in the contiguous zone.30 This doctrine was first pro-
pounded in 1826 by Justice Story in the Marianna Flora.3 1
Although there have been no decisions concerning the applica-
bility of this doctrine in the case of a vessel violating a treaty area
on the high seas, in the leading American case on hot pursuit, Gil-
liam v. United States, decided in 1928, the declaration of the court
28. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 13, at art. 14.
29. 28 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 718 (1953).
30. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 13, at art. 23.
31. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826).
has been construed to mean, and vigorously critized,8 2 that where a
right of seizure is conferred by treaty to operate in a particular
maritime zone, the right of hot pursuit is also to be honored when
begun from the same zone.83
Thus far in the wet war, the Coast Guard has had to use "hot
pursuit" in two seizures involving Japanese vessels fishing in con-
tiguous waters. There has been no "hot pursuit" after vessels in
violation of treaty areas.
C. Force Majeure
The doctrine of force majeure is the humanitarian doctrine in in-
ternational law which provides that a vessel of any nation can seek
any safe haven or a port of refuge when an overwhelming force,
such as fire, disablement, storm, or mutiny, puts the vessel in grave
danger of loss.
34
This doctrine was most recently used in May 1966 when the Rus-
sian factory ship CHERNJAKHOVSK requested permission to put
into San Francisco Bay to make emergency repairs. After a Coast
Guard boarding party ascertained that engine repairs were neces-
sary, authorization was granted for the vessel to put into Drakes
Bay, 37 miles north of San Francisco. During the period the vessel
was within territorial waters it was kept under surveillance by a
Coast Guard cutter.
D. Constructive Presence
An obscure doctrine of the sea, "constructive presence," has be-
come a consideration with the advent of the modern self-sustained
foreign fishing fleets. This is the doctrine whereby a foreign vessel
on the high seas may be arrested and held responsible for a violation
of United States laws committed in United States territorial waters
by one of its boats or a boat from ashore acting in concert. Thus
there is a possibility that a mother ship on the high seas that per-
mits her catcher boats to fish in United States territorial waters or
in the contiguous fishery zone could be held equally guilty of illegal
fishing.3
5
32. Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea, 8 INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 96, 97 (1959).
33. M. McDouGAL & W. BuRKE, supra note 7, at 900.
34. P. JEssup, TnE LAW OF TEmITORIAL WATERs AND MARiTims JURIsDIc-
TION 195 (1927).
35. M. McDouGAL & W. BuKE, supra note 7, at 909.
Wet War-North Pacific
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
V. PROOF AND PROSECUTION
A. Disposition of Vessel
The Coast Guard air and sea patrol of the North Pacific acts as an
arm of the United States Attorney in collection of evidence for the
prosecution of violations of federal laws. With repect to high seas
treaty area violations, the Coast Guard acts for the Department of
State in gathering evidence to serve as a basis for diplomatic pro-
tests.
The Coast Guard has statutory authority to stop, search, and seize
foreign vessels on the high seas for violation of United States laws
and to use all necessary force to compel compliance. 36
If a vessel is seized for a fishing violation on the territorial sea
or in the contiguous fishery zone, it is escorted or towed to the near-
est United States port. The master is then taken before a United
States District Judge or a United States Commissioner for arraign-
ment and the setting of bond. The vessel's gear, cargo, and hull is
appraised at the same time for forfeiture valuation.
Japanese vessels seized for treaty area violations are usually
turned over to the Japanese patrol vessels which accompany the gi-
ant Japanese fishing fleet. Since the fishing treaties between the
United States and Russia do not provide for seizure there have been
no incidents of violation of treaty area. To date two Russian traw-
lers have been seized, one of them twice, for violation of the con-
tiguous fishery zone. These vessels were released after the fines
were paid.
B. Geographical Position
The geographical position of the vessel is the essential element in
establishing a violation of treaty or statute. Detailed instructions
have been disseminated to Coast Guard vessels to assist them in
compiling the necessary evidence to prove a violation.37 The longi-
tude and latitude of the positions of the foreign vessel when first ob-
served in violation, when ordered to heave to, and when finally
stopped and boarded, are to be fixed by precise navigational meth-
36. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1950).
37. See U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 5921.1b, July 21, 1966,
containing operational instructions.
ods. LORAN, TACAN, radar and fathometer are normally used.
The instruments used must then be checked for accuracy. The cal-
culations used to establish positions or to determine instrument er-
ror must be recorded and preserved. Photographs are taken of
pertinent ship's log entries and of fixes on navigational charts.
In the event the case comes to trial, the Coast Guard boarding of-
ficer must be prepared to testify to the location of the vessel seized
and how the position was determined. Heretofore, in every case
except one, the master of the seized vessel has through his attorney
pleaded nolo contendere and a fine has been levied. The amount of
fines has progressively increased until the most recent fine of
$50,000 and one year's suspended sentence which was levied against
the KYOYO MARU.
C. Treaty Violations
In the case of high seas treaty area violators, the practice is to
gather all documentary evidence necessary to support the charge
and form the basis for a diplomatic protest. In addition, the holds
of the vessel are sealed so that the illegal catch can be used as evi-
dence of violation. In most cases, the seized vessel, together with
the documentary evidence, is turned over to enforcement patrol
vessels which accompany the fishing fleet. A duplicate package
of the documentary evidence is furnished the Department of State
for forwarding through diplomatic channels to the Japanense gov-
ernment.
In October 1970 the United States requested that information on
disposition of the cases of high seas treaty violations where the vessel
and evidence was turned over to Japan for prosecution be furnished
the United States State Department. The Japanese representative
declined and pointed out that the treaty imposes no obligation to
give such information. 38 Consideration is now being given to
amending the agreement between the United States, Canada, and
Japan so as to provide that such information be made available to
the signatory nations.
VI. CONCLTUSIONS
The United States offensive in the North Pacific "wet war" has
been underway for 5 years. The success of the venture is debat-
able. It is estimated that only 5 percent of foreign vessels violating
38. See report of Annual Conference of Signatories to the International
North Pacific Fisheries Convention in Tokyo, October 1970.
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the contiguous zone are apprehended.3 9 This estimate is not un-
reasonable considering that the Alaska coastline is longer than the
combined total of the Pacific, Gulf, and Atlantic coasts; and, there
are only four aircraft and an average of three cutters for the
Alaska patrol.
40
There are indications that the Northwest fishing interests are not
satisfied with the effort to curtail the depletion of United States
fishery stocks. At the urging of this group, two Bills were intro-
duced at the 91st Session of Congress, one to increase the sanctions
for violation of the contiguous zone and the other to extend the con-
tiguous zone farther out into the high seas. The first Bill, which
would increase the maximum penalty for illegal fishing from
$10,000 to $100,000, authorize more cutters and aircraft for patrol
purposes, and authorize the payment of $5,000 to informers was
passed on October 27, 1970 as Public Law 91-514.
41
The second Bill would extend the limits of the contigous zone out
to 20 miles.42 Aside from the almost insurmountable task of pa-
trolling an area this large, which would require a peacetime ar-
mada, such a proposal is in direct opposition to the long held United
States policy of refusing to recognize the 200-mile exclusive fishery
zones claimed by El Salvador, Panama, Uraguay, Ecuador, Peru, and
Argentina.
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Assuming that with an increase in the number of cutters, seizures
would accelerate, the question still remains: "Is protection of a
contiguous fishery zone the solution to depletion of fishery re-
sources?" A corollary question might be: "Is the United States
attempting to conserve a resource or preserve an industry?" Al-
39. Hearings on H.R. 14678, H.R. 14824 Before the Subcomm. on Fish-
eries and Wildlife Conservation of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 91st Cong. 1st & 2d Sess. at 165 (1969-1970).
40. Id. at 31.
41. H.R. 14678, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ("Bill to Strengthen the Penal-
ties for Illegal Fishing in the Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Fish-
ery Zone of the United States").
42. H.R. 18345, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ("Bill to Amend the Act en-
titled 'An Act to establish a Contiguous Fishery Zone Beyond the Terri-
torial Sea of the United States', approved October 14, 1966, to Extend the
Seaward Boundary of the Contiguous Fishery Zone to Two Hundred Nau-
tical Miles").
43. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-76 (1964) (Protection of Vessels on the High
Seas and in Territorial Waters of Foreign Countries).
though both functions can be categorized as conservation, a con-
tiguous fishery zone and strict enforcement does questionable service
to conservation policies. The main accomplishment is the reserva-
tion of exclusive competence to the coastal state to embark upon
conservation measures or to ignore conservation measures.
The Department of Interior advised Congress that the extension
of the fisheries jurisdiction of the United States would have little
long-term value in solving conservation problems. The reason for
that view was that a significant portion of the fish stocks now sup-
porting United States coastal fisheries freely move from coastal wa-
ters to the high seas.
44
It would appear that rather than unilaterally extending fishery
jurisdiction beyond 12 miles, it would be preferable for the United
States to seek another international conference and obtain general
concurrence and agreement from the international community.
Two principles that could be advanced to provide a foundation for
international agreement are:
45
1. Greater acceptance by all nations that ocean fishery re-
sources should be harvested with due regard for the mainte-
nance of the yield of the resource.
2. Recognition and acceptance of the special interest of the
coastal state in resources lying off its coast.
It is suggested that the problem of the Russian and Japanese de-
pletion of fish on the ocean floor might have been handled more
satisfactorily by agreement than by unilateral action. The United
States could have invited Russia, Japan, and Canada to a conference
to consider joint measures of investigation and control. The possi-
bility of cooperation on conservation measures between these coun-
tries is evidenced by the successful management of the fur seal
herds of the North Pacific since 1911.40
The Russians have evidenced some readiness for international
conservation and are members with the United States in such
agreements as the International Whaling Commission, the Interna-
tional Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, and the
King-Crab Treaty.47 Although Russia is not a party to the Con-
44. H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966).
45. Address by Donald McKernan, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State for Fisheries and Wildlife, before the National Canners Association,
January, 1968.
46. J. Tomasevich, International Agreements on Conservation of Ma-
rine Resources, at 77, 78 (1943).
47. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1966).
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vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, this refusal is not on conservation grounds but is based
on refusal to accept the convention's compulsory arbitration
clauses.
48
Efforts toward establishing a North Pacific Fishing Authority
might be worth pursuing at this time. All four of the chief user
states of the North Pacific fishery resources border the North Pa-
cific region. All four have contributed to international arrange-
ments affecting the exploitation of the resources of the North Pa-
cific.
49
There are some immediate advantages in continuing the present
system of short-term bilateral agreements on the allocation of re-
sources, such as the King Crab Treaty and the conservation of sock-
eye salmon, both for the United States and the non-coastal states.
However, a large-scale regional scheme of authority covering the
North Pacific which would seek to establish a balance between the
special interest of the coastal state and the general interest of non-
coastal regional and extraregional users of the region's resources
might provide greater and longer lasting advantages.
There appears to be an immediate need to establish such a North
Pacific authority. Already a South Korean fishing fleet, with no
treaty responsibilities, is harvesting the North Pacific resources.
It is only a matter of time before the expanding fleets of Taiwan
and Communist China extend their operations to the rich fishing
grounds in the Western North Pacific. Perhaps if the four user
states were to make the benefits of cooperation with the regional
scheme attractive and known to the international community, par-
ticipaton would be sought by the newcomers.
It is hoped that the United States will not be caught up in the
frenzy of protectiveness that has compelled some states to make
exgagerated unilateral claims; its countervailing interest in the
freedom of the seas will likely prevent such a development.5 0 But
the issue of the division of fishery resources will not disappear. The
unabating quest for food will ultimately lead the nations of the
48. Id. at 89.
49. D. JOHNSTON, THE INTEmNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIuES 264-82, 370-96
(1965).
50. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-76, supra note 43.
world to the ocean's bounty and unless means are devised by which
the harvest will be allocated to all, it will unavoidably go only "to
the most ruthless and the most powerful.""'
Perhaps the next decade will see Coast Guard cutters deployed
more profitably as a vanguard of an United Nations seagoing en-
forcement agency sailing the Seven Seas to ensure that vessels of
member nations are fishing in compliance with treaty restructions.
In this way, conservation of the world fishing resources could be
truly conserved for the benefit of mankind.
51. M. MCDOUGAL & W. BuRaE, supra note 7, at 562.
